We are building a rich pipeline of assets in four main therapeutic spaces: immuno-oncology, the leadership pipeline pdf download, haematology and infectious diseases. Our most advanced assets entered development in 2015 with first proof of concepts scheduled for readout by 2019. It is the first regional natural gas transmission system in sub-Saharan Africa. Nigerian gas on West African markets deemed that a project was commercially viable.
In September 1995, the governments of four African countries signed a Heads of State Agreement. The feasibility study was carried out in 1999. In February 2000, an Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed. The WAGP implementation agreement was signed in 2003. Ghana, on 3 December 2004.
The offshore pipeline was completed in December 2006 and was scheduled to start operating on 23 December 2007 but was delayed after leaks were detected in supply pipelines in Nigeria. The second delivery deadline was scheduled on 13 February 2008, but regular deliveries were delayed again, when one of the contractors of Willbros was shot and killed in Nigeria by armed robbers. However, deliveries were postponed again due to an irregular amount of moisture found inside the onshore gas pipeline. The pipeline was constructed by Willbros, with Bredero Shaw Ltd applying a concrete coating to the pipeline at its facility in Tema, Ghana.
The pre-commissioning services were provided by BJ Process and Pipeline Services. 75 million political risk guarantee for WAGPo as a whole. The managing director of the company is Walter Perez. It is operated by Chevron Corporation.
Nigeria complained it would damage land, destroy livelihoods and pollute fishing areas. On August 27, 2012, the West African Gas Pipeline was damaged when pirates who had tried to board an oil tanker in an attempt to get away from the pursuing Togolese Navy, severely damaged the pipeline with their anchor. For nearly a year, the supply of gas to Ghana, Togo and Benin ceased, causing major power supply problems to the affected countries. This page was last edited on 2 December 2017, at 18:14.
A map of pipelines in the United States as of September, 2015. Red is hazardous liquid pipelines, including crude oil. 2004, responsible for developing and enforcing regulations for the safe, reliable, and environmentally sound operation of the US’ 2. It oversees the nation’s pipeline infrastructure, which accounts for 64 percent of the energy commodities consumed in the United States. Made up of the Office of Pipeline Safety and the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety.
PHMSA was created within the U. DOT under the Norman Y. She resigned in October 2014. October 2017, is the current Administrator.
Prior to 2005 the U. Research and Special Programs Improvement Act of 2004 provided these, with an opportunity to establish mode government budget and information practices in support of then president Bush’s ‘Management Agenda’ initiatives. OHMS promulgates a national safety program, which consists of: evaluating safety risks, developing and enforcing standards for transporting hazardous materials, educating shippers and carriers, investigating hazmat incidents and failures, conducting research, providing grants to improve emergency response to incidents. 80 percent of the funds states spend on pipeline safety comes from PHMSA. The ‘Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996’ requires that OPS adopt rules requiring interstate gas pipeline operators to provide maps of their facilities to the governing body of each municipality, in which the pipeline is located.
In 2012, it returned with restriction of use. As of 2014, OPS and PMHSA respectively, have not set minimum qualifications for state inspectors, who lead inspection teams. In one state, for example, an inspector with less than one year’s experience was allowed to lead inspections. United States as of 2015. 86 were serious incidents involving hazardous liquids pipelines. This is an average of approximately 560 incidents per year in the last 20 years for all types of pipelines. These incidents caused a total of 360 fatalities and 1,376 injuries.
San Francisco, killed eight people, injured 58 and destroyed much of a subdivision. E was indicted in U. District Court, San Francisco, California, for multiple violations of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 relating to its record keeping and pipeline “integrity management” practices. In 2011, the PHMSA came under criticism for not releasing a Canadian company’s plans for managing oil spills and estimating a worst-case scenario in the event its pipeline burst in the US.
Congress to pass legislation that would increase penalties for negligent operators and authorize the hiring of additional inspectors. Federal records showed that although the pipeline industry reported 25 percent fewer significant incidents from 2001 through 2010 than in the prior decade, the amount of hazardous liquids being spilled remained substantial. There were more than 100 significant spills each year, a trend that dates back more than 20 years. The percentage of dangerous liquids recovered by pipeline operators after a spill dropped considerably. In 2013, PHMSA’s Jeffrey Wiese told several hundred oil and gas pipeline compliance officers that his agency has “very few tools to work with”, in enforcing safety rules, even after Congress in 2011 allowed it to impose higher fines on companies that cause major accidents. PHMSA did not ensure “that key state inspectors are properly trained, inspections are being conducted frequently enough and inspections target the most risky pipelines”. At the end of FY2012, PHMSA employed 203 staff in total, including 135 inspection and enforcement staff.